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ABSTRACT: The author argues that recent data suggesting an emerging culture of gullibility among young 
Internet users is best explained by the latter’s non-culpable misapplication of common testimonial norms to 
Internet settings. The author further argues for the likelihood that the norms relative to such settings will 
gradually change, basing this upon research done on the types of norms of trust that tend to evolve in 
repeated transactions involving significant informational asymmetries. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We all have our anecdotes. The bright young student who wrote her paper on 
immigration reform, relying on cached pages from what turns out to be a White Power 
website. The sincere young activist who argues that adoption is dangerous for children, 
based on statistics compiled by an organization proclaiming on its (unread) homepage 
that it opposes the interference of the state in what it calls the sanctity of the biological 
family. 
And not all of our anecdotes are so rarefied or are confined to academia. There is 
the modern Moll Flanders who goes looking for a paramour through a Facebook page 
complete with a fake name, a fake occupation, and a photo from a fashion model website 
and is stupefied when she discovers that the young man that she has managed to snag 
through this method has engaged in a parallel deception. There is the enterprising high 
school boy from a Milwaukee suburb who manages to persuade thirty-one of his male 
fellow students to send him images of themselves nude: this based solely on the high 
school boy’s representation of himself in an online chat room as a high school girl 
(Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Feb. 10, 2009). 
 “What’s going on here?” we ask ourselves. Even high school boys must surely 
know that not everyone who claims to be something or other actually is that something or 
other. Even they must surely know as well that looking at typed letters on a screen is not 
a particularly effective way of determining whether what one says about ones bodily 
attributes is true. By the same token, it seems a natural assumption that if a person has 
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evolved a strategy for deviously exploiting the relative anonymity of the Internet, that 
that person would be wary of the use of such a strategy by others and would in some way 
prepare for or at least anticipate it.  
 More to the point, in terms of what I will be talking about in this paper, given the 
incredible ease with which a traditionally-aged college student can access a planet-wide 
compendium of useful information, it is jarring to see some apparently unable to click 
one page away from the page on which they discovered the data that they were looking 
for to check for the mission statement of the organization offering that data or in some 
way to verify the organization’s bona fides. The best explanation for this is probably that 
they saw no need. And that is perhaps the most jarring thing of all. 
 These are just anecdotes. But in the last few years, more and more data has been 
compiled on how traditionally-aged college students (ages 18-21), and young people in 
general, use Internet sources for recreation and socialization, as well as for research and 
other argumentative purposes. With respect to the latter, which will be the primary focus 
of this paper, one very common interpretation of this data is negative. It is that the subject 
group as a whole tends to be, as I shall call it, gullible with respect to these sources. That 
is, they appear to act in accordance with certain common norms with regard to these 
sources’ authoritative or evidential value that are in an important sense rationally suspect 
or degraded. Some popular commentators have even gone so far as to see this data as 
supporting a thesis of an emerging culture of youth gullibility with respect to the 
Internet—a “dumbest generation” as one writer has deemed it (Bauerlein 2008)—with 
dire consequences for rational argumentation and civic discourse in an increasingly 
Internet-dominated age. 
 It is the thesis of this paper, however, that—anecdotes notwithstanding—such 
fears are misplaced and that the apparent gullibility of college-age Internet users is best 
explained by their application of a set of norms for testimonial reliability that are well-
founded in many other contexts, but that are often inappropriate when applied to online 
encounters. In what follows, I will seek to provide an outline of these norms and show 
how acting in accordance with them would produce the phenomenon in question. In 
addition, I would like to make a prediction. For it is my belief that we are probably in the 
midst of an emerging amendment of these norms relative to certain Internet contexts. I 
base this on some more recent data on the use of the Internet by the target population and 
on the predictive power of a particular model of information use and exchange which I 
think captures well what is often going on in cases of this kind. 
 
2. EVIDENCE OF THE PROBLEM  
 
The first thing to know about the research that has been done on this topic is that 
researchers have not always had in their sights the same quarry. Some researchers, for 
example, Metzger and Flanagin (2007) and Rieh and Hilligan (2007), have been 
interested in exploring what they call student credibility assessments. That is, they have 
been interested in examining how it is that students make the judgment that one Internet 
website manifests or communicates expertise and trustworthiness to a greater degree than 
another. They pay special attention to those standards of credibility that they deem to be 
appropriate in cases of this kind—accuracy, comprehensiveness, professionalism, sponsor 
credentials, the content of policy or mission statements, the use of advertising, and firm 
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or author reputation—and determine to what extent students cite these as a basis for their 
judgments (Metzger & Flanagin 2007, p. 18). 
 Other researchers, such as those working for the Educational Testing Service 
(ETS), are looking for something broader. They are investigating the extent to which 
college-age students are embodying something they call Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) literacy. A student is reckoned by these researchers 
to have this form of literacy when they have successfully completed a set of fifteen 
separate tasks on a standardized seventy-five-minute test. Some of the tasks—such as 
determining a website’s objectivity and identifying trustworthy sources—clearly overlap 
with the work being done on credibility assessments. Others—such as organizing emails 
and files into appropriate folders and ranking webpages according to a variety of 
arbitrarily selected standards—clearly do not (ICT Literacy Assessment 2006). 
 Still other researchers get at the topic more indirectly. This includes Grazioli and 
Jarvenpaa (2000) and Yamagishi and Matsuda (2002), who investigate the question of 
student credibility assessments by studying patterns of student risk-taking in relation to 
online sites, surreptitiously invented by the study authors, offering the subjects various 
products and investment opportunities. 
 However, despites these differences in focus and extent, when it comes to those 
areas where they do overlap, the stories told by these researchers and others like them are 
remarkably similar. In November 2006, when the Educational Testing Service gathered 
together over six thousand traditionally-aged college students and administered their 
seventy-five-minute exam, they found that, while most of the students knew that dot-edu 
and dot-gov sites tend to be less biased than dot-coms, only about half, in the judgment of 
the researchers, were able to correctly judge the objectivity of a given site when 
“selecting a research statement for a class assignment” (ICT Literacy Assessment 2006). 
Irvin Katz, the senior scientist at ETS, put it this way: “While college-age students can 
use technology, they don’t necessarily know what to do with the content technology 
provides” (Bauerlein 2008, p. 116). In 2005, when the educational policy group 
EDUCAUSE did its “ECAR Study of Students and Information Technology 2005: 
Convenience, Control, and Learning,” they discovered that there was among their 
subjects an inverse relation between a student’s technological aptitude and his or her level 
of comfort or ability with respect to manipulating or evaluating content (ECAR Study of 
Students and Information Technology 2005, Executive Summary). It is information such 
as this that has led one California webdesign consulting firm, the Nielsen Norman Group, 
to advise its clients to make the language of their youth-directed websites sound as 
objective and evidence-based as possible, so that “users don’t suffer the added cognitive 
burden of distinguishing fact from bias and exaggeration” (Bauerlein 2008, p. 151). 
 And there’s more. According to a study of over 2500 college-age participants 
done by Fogg, et al (2003), the single most crucial element for a student in determining 
whether or not a website is credible is how it is designed, which includes the quality of its 
graphics, the beauty of its layout, its navigability, and its overall functionality (Rieh & 
Hilligan, 2007, p. 63). According to a study reported by Thacker in his article “Are 
College Students Techno Idiots?” (2006), less than one percent of all Google searches by 
college-age students extend beyond the second page of results, despite the students’ 
knowledge that such entries are ranked purely on the basis of how many hits each one 
receives. In a study of eighty college-age students in the year 2000, Grazioli and 
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Jarvenpaa discovered that when it came to providing third party seals of approval for 
their products or services, Internet vendors did not need to provide these subjects with 
evidence that their corroborators were independent—or even that their corroborators had 
approved of the vendor’s claims. The vendor’s assertion on the company website that 
their corroborators were independent and approved of the vendor was enough. A similar 
experiment by Yamagishi and Matsuda (2002) suggested that, for this population, even 
high risk for a buyer does not tend to be associated with a request for evidence about the 
corroborator’s bona fides. So long as the subject has heard nothing negative about the 
corroborator—even when she or he has heard nothing about the corroborator either 
way—the subject will tend to accept the vendor’s assertion of corroborator independence 
and approval. 
 For those worried about an emerging culture of youth gullibility, the Grazioli and 
Jarvenpaa study is especially troubling. For what Grazioli and Jarvenpaa did in their 
study was to set up a fake website, complete with a fake seal of approval from the Better 
Business Bureau. They then directed their student participants to “buy” products and 
services from this and other websites, if they so chose, based upon their judgments of 
those sites’ trustworthiness. (The students, you’ll be happy to know, did not spend any 
real money in these transactions. There was, however, among the students, some social 
stigma attached to spending one’s notional dollars foolishly. This provided what the 
researchers deemed a significant enough risk to make the study informative.) 
 But there was a twist to the experiment. For what Grazioli and Jarvenpaa also did 
was to create a link on their fake website, through their fake Better Business Bureau 
graphic, to the actual website of the Better Business Bureau, which was collaborating 
with the researchers. On this website, an enterprising student could easily discover both 
that the fake website was a fake website and that the Better Business Bureau had not 
given the website its seal of approval. And yet, even in this experimental situation, where 
some risk was attached to making the wrong decision and the evidence necessary to 
demonstrate the falsity of the website’s claims was only a click away, only eight out of 
eighty students availed themselves of this option. Indeed, out of the eighty student 
participants in this study, seventy-six percent ended up ordering one of the products 
advertised on the bogus site (Grazioli & Jarvenpaa 2000, p. 403). It is research such as 
this that has led Metzger and Flanagin (2007, p. 18) to conclude “Empirical studies […] 
find that credibility is not a primary concern of young people when using digital media.” 
 Now I know what you’re thinking. Where’s the control group? Where’s the 
evidence in all of this that justifies even an initial claim of an emerging culture of youth 
gullibility as opposed to gullibility across the board. And the answer is: there isn’t any. 
For all we know, a gaggle of eighty fifty-five year olds would have been just as likely to 
buy whatever items were being purveyed on Grazioli and Jarvenpaa’s sham website as 
sixty-one eighteen to twenty-one year olds were. The difference, the advocates of the 
youth gullibility thesis would say, is that the fifty-five year olds are still also operating 
with other media and other standards, which have structured their reactions differently. 
For example, according to Beltramini and Stafford (1993), older Americans are more 
likely than younger ones to be aware of the existence of the various organizations, like 
the Better Business Bureau, that provide seals of approval and of the reasons behind their 
claims of independence. Older individuals are also more likely to use books, magazines, 
and newspapers as their primary sources of entertainment, edification, and information 
 
 
4
INTERNET TESTIMONY 
about the world. And, in doing so, they are more likely to accept the implicit “gradation 
for quality” that is involved at every step of their publication and distribution (Bauerlein 
2008, p. 159). 
 Contrast this, however, with the vast majority of eighteen to twenty-one year olds, 
for whom the Internet has become the almost exclusive source for all of the above, with 
its incredible “democratization” of knowledge and access. According to a study by the 
National School Boards (July 2007), the use of the Internet by college age students 
expands every year, with thirty percent of students with online access running their own 
blogs. According to a report by the Pew Internet & American Life Project (2001), one-
half of all US teenagers are “content creators,” making webpages, posting art, 
photographs, fiction, and videos online. And this trend is only going to continue with the 
next generation. For, according to the 2003 Kaiser Study of Entertainment Media and 
Health, six month to six year old children already spend as much time looking at a screen 
as they do playing outside (about two hours a day). And fifty-four percent of eight to 
eighteen year olds daily spend forty-eight minutes of their time online. 
In addition, it is argued, what alternative models of communication and 
communication assessment students do have available to them are mostly imposed upon 
them through structures and by institutions that are external to their immediate social 
milieu: in other words, colleges and universities. And while such entities, through their 
curricular offerings, may emphasize the need for slowing down the process of research 
and for double-checking on sources found on the Internet, this seems barely to have made 
a dent in students’ use of these resources outside of the classroom setting, where the best 
evidence suggests that they prize above all “time [that is, speed], convenience, access, 
familiarity with resources/systems and so on” (Rieh & Hilligan 2007, p. 57). As one 
commentator puts it, summarizing the data along these lines, students believe that “the 
things that have traditionally been done—you know, reflection and thinking and all that 
stuff—are in some ways too slow for the future” (Prensky, in Bauerlein 2008, p. 87). 
So is there an emerging culture of youth gullibility or isn’t there? This is an 
empirical question that, as a philosopher, I am not professionally qualified to answer. I 
am, however, qualified to answer a different sort of question (or at least I am qualified 
enough to have my attempt to answer this different sort of question treated with an initial 
degree of interest and respect.) And that is the question: if college-age students were 
engaging in the activities suggested by this data, would that necessarily be a bad thing? 
More to the point, would it be evidence for the claim that they were all being gullible, 
that their standards of evaluating evidence based upon testimony (or authority) were lax 
or degraded? As I have already indicated, I do not think so. In such a situation, some 
would no doubt have degraded standards, but some might not. And the ones that didn’t 
would not necessarily be the ones that were doing something different in this situation 
from what’s being described. That’s my claim and I would now like to argue for it. 
 
3. THE NATURE OF TESTIMONY 
 
Out of the various pieces of evidence presented in the last section that have been offered 
in favor of the claim of youth gullibility, let us focus on the following four, which I take 
to be—and I think you would agree are—the most damaging: 
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 In a recent series of tests, half of all college-age participants were unable to 
judge the “objectivity” of a given website. 
 In a recent survey, the single most crucial element for college-age students in 
determining whether or not a website is credible is how well it is designed. 
 In a recent study, less than one percent of all Google searches by college-age 
students extended beyond the second page of results, despite the fact that they 
knew these are arranged solely by the total number of hits. 
 In a recent experiment, only eight out of eighty college age participants 
checked the bona fides of a third party seal of approval on a vendor website, 
where a bad purchase entailed a level of embarrassment or exposure. 
 
Is there a way of understanding the nature of testimony that would be consistent 
with a non-gullibilistic interpretation of these students’ actions? I believe that there is 
when we think about what people communicate to one another and what each can learn 
through this process in terms of the commitments that communicators undertake when 
they take the trouble to make an assertion and what can potentially occur when these 
commitments are lightly or deceptively engaged in. 
This, what we can call, “Commitment View of Testimony” is, of course, one that 
I have had the opportunity to advocate for in the past. Conceiving of it in its most basic or 
familiar form, the View’s proponents are committed to picturing testimonial interaction, 
in the words of my colleague Fred Kauffeld, as consisting of:  
 
(i) a speaker who serves as the Testimony Source (S) and an addressee(s) to whom the testimony is 
given, the Testimony Recipient (R); (ii) a statement which serves as S’s testimony; (iii) an 
expression of S’s consent to critical examination of her statement(s); and (iv) S’s pledge to speak 
truthfully (Kauffeld & Fields 2005, p. 233). 
 
 There are two unique elements in the Commitment View of Testimony. One is the 
contention that there exists a deep connection between S’s act of making the statement 
referred to in (ii) and S’s acts of consenting to an examination of her statement(s) and of 
pledging to speak truthfully. Although these can, of course, be discrete, explicit acts in 
certain testimonial encounters, characterized by separate, overt guarantees (Kauffeld 
gives the example of a statement by former Enron executive Kristina Mordaut to show 
what this would look like (2005, p. 233)), in many cases, they are not. In those cases, it is 
maintained, it is the act of testifying itself, of “deliberately and openly” asserting that 
something is the case, that signals to the testimony recipient R that S is also speaking 
with “the intention of answering investigator’s objections” and the intention to 
communicate that she “attests to the veracity of her testimony” (Kauffeld & Fields 2005, 
pp. 233-234). 
 The reason why this act of testifying can operate in this way on the Commitment 
View of Testimony (indeed, one might say, the reason why we can think of it as an act of 
testifying in the first place) has to do with the pragmatic context in which S makes her 
assertion: a context that S is aware of and understands that R is aware of and understands 
that R understands that S is aware of and understands that R is aware of, and so on. This 
is the context in which Rs everywhere—a role that all of us are in at some point in time—
are attempting “to collect and evaluate statements as evidence bearing on R’s inquiry into 
matters of serious concern to R” (Kauffeld & Fields, 2005, p. 235). Because such 
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inquiries can “rarely be conducted entirely on the basis of [the] inquirer’s first hand 
experience,” the collaboration of others is needed. But this reliance on others creates a 
practical difficulty, for “persons responsible for a serious inquiry typically cannot just 
accept what others are willing to tell them on the basis of the other’s say so” (Kauffeld & 
Fields 2005, p. 235). And those that are potential testifiers are as aware of this as those 
that are engaged in the various inquiries, as was just mentioned. 
 For R, one way out of this practical difficulty would be to grill each of her 
potential sources beforehand to establish his or her sincerity and competence. But this 
would not be a very productive way in which to proceed. As we can see from actual 
conversational interactions, issues of honor and respect immediately come into play on 
those occasions where an individual’s trustworthiness is called into question. The 
potential S in such a case may well simply withdraw from such an interaction, thinking, 
as Kauffeld puts it, “If you’re not going to believe what I say, what’s the point of 
answering your questions?” (Kauffeld & Fields 2005, p. 236)  Moreover, conceptually, 
the attempt to engage in this sort of investigation seems confused. For if, in doing so, R is 
relying upon S’s word to establish whether S’s word is to be relied upon, the danger of a 
vicious circle arises. On the other hand, if R is relying upon the word of others to 
establish this, then the question arises of whether R ought not to cross-examine these 
other sources first, raising the spectre of an infinite regress (cf. Coady 1992, pp. 79-100).  
 So what is required instead in such a case is a solution that both allows R to rely 
upon S and allows this in a way that does not force R to try to establish beforehand S’s 
credibility. And that, according to the proponents of the Commitment View of Testimony 
is the solution that we find in the situation just described. S, knowing the quandary that R 
is in and wanting to convince R that what S says is true, undertakes to assure R of S’s 
trustworthiness in the only practical way that S can. That is by openly taking 
responsibility for what S maintains. Sometimes this is done overtly, as in the Kristina 
Mordaut case. But in other circumstances it must be the case that it is intended and 
understood. For why else would S imagine that S could be successful in S’s attempt to 
relay p to R? Why else would R be willing to learn p from S unless S’s commitment was 
understood: that is, unless S had through her very assertion raised the “unsettling risk of 
exposure” that functions to reassure R that S is honest? (Kauffeld & Fields 2005, p. 236)  
 The other unique element of this View is the assertion that that is what testimonial 
evidence consists of—claims made in this way, within this sort of pragmatic context. 
Going back to Locke and Hume, philosophers have searched for the special warrant that 
justifies taking what someone else has said as a rational basis for making certain sorts of 
claims about the world, claims not based upon one’s own memory or perceptions. And 
the answers that they have come up with have been many. Some have seen this warrant in 
a general principle of charity that we must all embrace as a necessary precondition for the 
possibility of language (Coady 1992, pp. 152-176). Others have seen a more specific 
warrant arising in those situations where a speaker successfully survives an ongoing, 
though not terribly grueling, assessment in terms of trustworthiness done by a hearer or 
addressee (Fricker 1994, p. 145). Still others have held that there is no warrant to be 
found here, either general or specific, and that testimony as a species of evidence must 
always be checked against the beliefs provided through other, more fundamental, 
evidential channels. 
 Again, I have had occasion to defend the Commitment Theory of Testimony on 
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this score in the past and I do not wish to rehearse those arguments here (Kauffeld & 
Fields 2005; Fields 2007). Suffice it to say that, as I see it, the View has two things going 
for it in this regard. It is much more feasible as a description of what people actually do 
and what options they seem to have available to them than the alternatives (see especially 
my discussion of Elizabeth Fricker in Fields 2007). And it can be made consistent with 
certain common notions of what evidence consists of. All that one need do is remind 
oneself that an openly undertaken commitment on the part of a testimonial source S can 
be seen as evidence in favor of S’s trustworthiness and that this can in turn be defined as 
an ongoing disposition or propensity to reliably reflect and transmit the apparent truth of 
the world around us (Kauffeld & Fields 2005, pp. 240-241). 
 So, what does this Commitment View of Testimony have to tell us about the 
question of potential youth gullibility? As I see it, a great deal. Notice, first of all, that the 
motive force of this View is the concept of reputation. Reputation, on this View, is the 
only thing that a testimonial source S has to offer an addressee or recipient R that would 
help to convince R that S is cooperating with R in achieving at least some of R’s 
epistemic and doxastic goals. By openly espousing certain claims and thereby inviting 
further inspection, S makes herself potentially vulnerable to embarrassment, scorn, even 
ridicule. She risks the likelihood of losing her reputation, of being designated by her 
peers as an unreliable collaborator in their respective searches, either with respect to 
some specific situations and subject matter or more generally. 
 This would seem to be a powerful token and guarantor of S’s cooperation. And it 
seems especially powerful when we consider the extent to which violations of trust and 
confidence are communicated between and among us and swiftly—though usually 
informally—punished (Livingstone Smith 2004, p. 140). By the same token, it seems an 
even more powerful avowal to those that are receiving it, when they also have no 
evidence that the speaker’s reputation is not spotless. Given the alacrity with which a 
reputation for incompetence or insincerity spreads and the intensity of negative feelings 
that it tends to occasion, the absence of evidence of a bad reputation on the part of one 
who is testifying seems an especially compelling warrant for accepting what that 
individual has said. And this seems especially true in those cases where the speaker is 
engaged in communication with a great many individuals at the same time, where the 
likelihood of someone being able to discover a flaw in what the speaker has said is 
greatly enhanced. 
 At this point, you can probably already see where I am going to go next. Consider 
the claim that less than one percent of all Google searches by college-age students extend 
beyond the second page of results. Why is this so terrible? One completely plausible way 
of construing this is that these students see these sites as the ones that have survived the 
wear and tear of the ongoing reputation game. The authors of the content on these sites, 
in their eyes, have openly made a variety of claims; people from all over the world have 
read these claims and talked about them with their friends, family, fellow students, and 
fellow Internet users; and the result has been that (a) many, many people have flocked to 
that site, and (b) many of those who might have gone to another site, and moved it up the 
scale, didn’t. In other words, the relative level of scorn, ridicule, and rejection is also 
fairly low. 
 The situation is similar for the fake Better Business Bureau logo. It is true that the 
students involved in that experiment did not click on this image to determine if it was 
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genuinely bestowed. But then, why would they have suspected that the logo was a fake? 
It was displayed openly on the site—and indeed, as it turned out, with the approval of the 
Better Business Bureau. And if the logo had not been on a fake website, concocted for the 
purpose of their experiment by Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, it seems reasonable to assume 
that someone would have caught that the graphic was fake, let’s say when they attempted 
to buy something from it and went to the Better Business Bureau for satisfaction. One 
could, of course, fault the students for their assumption that they were dealing with a 
genuine vendor’s site. But this seems unfair. If I assume about my dog, based on 
everything that I can observe about him, that he is perfectly healthy, I certainly have 
made a mistake if he turns out to have distemper. But I think that I have only gotten one 
thing wrong here: the state of the dog’s health. I don’t think that I have also failed in 
another task: to do, at every moment, a complete physical to ascertain the dog’s 
continued well-being. 
 The other two cases are slightly different, but involve similar sorts of problems. 
Take the case of the study indicating that college-age students see a website’s design 
features as the single most crucial element in determining its credibility. Let’s assume for 
the moment that that is true. On the surface, it sounds horrible—students going for all 
flash and no substance, a Twenty-First century redux of the ancient conflict between 
Socrates and the sophists. And yet when we focus on the notion of commitment, on the 
idea that a speaker, if intent on reaching a particular audience, will do what is 
pragmatically necessary to bring this about, improved design elements and positive 
student responses to them do not seem all that surprising. It takes time, effort, and/or 
money to create good design, or to buy the apps that enable one to do so. Were this all in 
the service of something of no account, or that could be quickly rejected, it would be a 
waste. It would be analogous to (though admittedly not identical with) the sort of 
negative effect on reputation that can occur when one stakes one’s reputation on 
something false or misleading. It would constitute a substantive penalty on the speaker: 
or at least it is consistent with their not being gullible that students see it in this way. 
 Finally, when it comes to judging the objectivity of a website, a variety of 
questions arise. Is objectivity the same thing as reliability? One can easily imagine a site 
that had as part of its mission statement to be objective, but that actually made more 
mistakes in what it presented than the one with a declared bias. Is it the same as claiming 
to be objective or what is generally regarded as being objective? Because, if it is either of 
these, then the basis upon which a student would have to determine that a site is objective 
is the site’s reputation in that regard. In the first case this would involve determining 
whether or not the site was living up to its profession. And in the second it would involve 
determining what other people were saying about it. The fact that a student would not 
know how to answer with respect to either of these would certainly indicate a gap in that 
student’s knowledge, a gap that may well need to be filled. But it would not necessarily 
indicate a gap in or a degradation of that student’s epistemic standards. After all, because 
we are not born knowing all, we must gradually learn whom to trust and whom not to 
trust through experience—often painful experience—and the fruits thereof. As Thomas 
Reid famously put it: 
 
The infant, by proper nursing, and care, acquires strength to walk without support. Reason hath 
likewise her infancy, when she must be carried in arms; then she leans entirely upon authority, by 
natural instinct, as if she were conscious of her own weakness; and, without this support, she 
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becomes vertiginous. When brought to maturity by proper culture [however], she begins to feel 
her own strength, and leans less upon the reason of others; she learns to suspect testimony in some 
cases, and to disbelieve it in others; and sets bounds to that authority to which she was at first 
entirely subject. (Reid 1997, p. 194) 
 
4. THE FORCE OF EXPERIENCE 
 
So I do not think that students are necessarily gullible if they are responding to 
information on the Internet in the ways that these studies indicate. But I am not entirely 
ready to let traditionally-aged college students off the hook nonetheless. For it may still 
be the case that they are incredibly ignorant about how the world works in general and in 
specific about what is going on the Internet. And this ignorance could itself be an 
explanation for why students use the Internet in the ways that they are alleged to do and it 
could also be something for which they are at least partially culpable. 
 Think about Thomas Reid’s comments about the infant’s slow progression to 
intellectual maturity. The most important catalyst for this process, to Reid’s mind, is 
“proper culture,” which he defines elsewhere as “knowledge of human life, and of the 
manners and characters of men” (Reid 1997, p. 194). Why is this so important? For the 
simple reason that without a “knowledge of human life, and of the manners and 
characters of men,” the best principles in the world, moral or epistemic, can be most 
grievously misapplied. If it is a proper principle of testimony, for example, that one take 
into consideration the reputation of a speaker, not knowing enough about the world to 
know what the speaker’s reputation is a significant impediment to gaining justified 
beliefs about the world. In addition, and on a grander scale, it constitutes an effective 
short-circuiting of the one element of a speaker’s commitment to what he or she has to 
say that packs any sort of genuine punch. 
 And so one needs to know what is going on. One needs to know that there are 
White Power websites out there and what their reputation for reliability might be. One 
needs to become familiar in general with the difference in reputation between various 
academic journals and personal blogs. One needs to realize the extent to which the 
relative anonymity of the Internet makes it harder to track the reputation of its various 
participants and ask what this might do to the level of commitment with which those 
participants make the various claims that they do.  
 I am in general optimistic that, as the Internet ages, and as those that use it age 
and gain more practical knowledge, whatever mismatches currently exist between 
principle and practice will gradually get worked out. For I am a firm believer in the self-
correcting nature of systems containing vast asymmetries in information. In such systems, 
sometimes called “lemons markets,” there exists an endemic tendency towards 
misrepresentation. But there also exists a tendency towards a modification of those 
asymmetries that are present, based on the threat of withdrawal from the market on the 
part of those that have been burned (Akerlof 1970, p. 489). To some extent, this has 
already been felt in the area of Internet dating, which has seen many changes in the last 
few years. It is reflected as well in some of the most recent work with students in how 
they use the Internet. A 2005-2006 study with students at the University of Michigan, for 
example, revealed that, after consistent use involving both personal and academic 
searches, participants began to slowly develop their own private reputation rankings for 
sites in terms of credibility. So, for example, one student in the study, looking for a 
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Halloween costume idea, went to Google, specifically because the information there is so 
general. Another, in doing research for a paper on the Gulf War, said that he went to 
Wikipedia specifically because he was dealing with what he called “an encyclopedia 
topic” (Rieh & Hilligan 2007, p. 56). 
 We as educators can help in this gradual process. That is because it is we who 
have the knowledge and the expertise to guide students in that knowledge of “the 
manners and characters of men” (and women!) that they so often desperately need. But 
no purpose is served, in my opinion, in chiding students or clucking our tongues over 
what is purported to be a devastating deterioration in rational standards. Indeed, such 
chiding and clucking seems ill-founded. The standards are fine. It’s just the knowledge 
background that’s needed to make them work that needs some improvement. 
 
         Link to commentary 
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